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Testimony of Professor Timothy Meyer 
Assistant Professor of Law 
University of Georgia School of Law 
 
November 5, 2013 
 
Hearing: Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
 
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker and Members of the Committee. 
Thank you for the invitation to testify today. My name is Timothy Meyer, and I am 
an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Georgia School of Law in 
Athens, Georgia. I am pleased to offer my thoughts regarding the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD” or “the Convention”).   
 
Like most human rights treaties, the CRPD establishes an expert committee, the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“the Committee” or “the 
Committee on Disabilities”). I would like to focus my testimony today on the 
Committee on Disabilities’ role in the implementation of the Convention. The 
Committee’s principal task is to consider reports made by parties to the CRPD 
about their measures taken to comply with the Convention.  The role of expert 
committees in general and the legal effect of their suggestions, 
recommendations, and comments is a subject of some debate among the 
various committees, member states, and academics.  On the one hand, a 
number of commentators have expressed concerns that ratifying the Convention 
will result in unelected officials from multilateral organizations rewriting American 
laws.  In response, others have pointed out that the Committee on Disabilities 
does not have the legal authority to compel any action by the United States. In 
my view, neither of these positions fully captures the way in which the 
suggestions, recommendations, and comments of human rights committees have 
effect.   
 
I wish to make two points today regarding the role of these committees in general 
and the Committee in particular.   
 
First, while reports of these expert committees are not legally binding, they do 
have legal significance because they influence how parties to the Convention 
perceive what constitutes compliance with treaty obligations and customary 
international law. 
 
Second, declining to ratify the treaty does not necessarily mean that 
interpretations of human rights norms developed by the Committee will not be 
asserted against the United States.  I therefore offer some possible 
understandings to the CRPD that would allow the United States to protect and 
advance its interests while ratifying the CRPD.  These understandings would 
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clarify that the Committee’s interpretations of the Convention are not due any 
deference from parties to the Convention.   
 
With that introduction, I will now elaborate on these points.  
 
THE “SOFT” LEGAL NATURE OF EXPERT COMMITTEES 
 
The CRPD requires that each State Party “submit to the Committee . . . a 
comprehensive report on measures taken to give effect to its obligations” under 
the Convention.  CRPD art. 35(1).  The CRPD then empowers the Committee on 
Disabilities to “make such suggestions and general recommendations on the 
report as it may consider appropriate.” CRPD art. 36(1). The Convention requires 
States Parties to make its reports “widely available to the public in their own 
countries and facilitate access to the suggestions and general recommendations” 
of the Committee.  CRPD art. 36(4).  The Committee on Disabilities is also 
authorized to “make suggestions and general recommendations based on the 
examinations of reports and information received from the States Parties” to the 
U.N. General Assembly and Economic and Social Council.  CRPD art. 39.  
Moreover, it is common practice for expert committees to issue “general 
comments” which elaborate a committee’s interpretation of the treaty it is 
charged with implementing.  The Committee on Disabilities has continued this 
practice.1 
 
As a matter of international law, the Committee’s suggestions, recommendations, 
and comments are not legally binding.  Nor does the Committee have the power 
itself to make customary international law. Provided that ratification of the 
Convention is accompanied by a declaration that the Convention is not self-
executing and a package of reservations, understandings, and declarations 
(RUDs) clarifying that the Convention does not impose any obligations on the 
United States beyond those offered under existing state and federal laws, such 
as the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Committee’s work cannot be the basis 
for legally compelling any changes to federal law.  Finally, the United States 
could ratify the Convention with a reservation to ensure that the United States 
undertakes no obligations that cannot be satisfied through federal legislation 
passed under Congress’s constitutionally-enumerated powers. Where disabilities 
are concerned, Congressional power to make federal laws flows primarily from 
Congress’s authority to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. U.S. 
Constitution, Art. I, Section 8.  The United States could ratify the Convention with 
a reservation to those obligations in the Convention that cannot be satisfied 
under Congress’s authority to regulate interstate or foreign commerce or under 
another of Congress’s enumerated powers.2   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See,	   e.g.,	   Draft	   General	   comment	   on	   Article	   12	   of	   the	   CRPD	   –	   Equal	   Recognition	  before	   the	   Law;	   Draft	   General	   Comment	   on	   Article	   9	   of	   the	   CRPD	   –	   Accessibility,	  2	  For	  example,	  in	  2005	  the	  United	  States	  ratified	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Transnational	  Organized	  Crime	  with	  a	  reservation	  providing	  that:	  
	   3	  
 
Although the Committee’s suggestions, recommendations, and comments are 
not legally binding, they nevertheless can have indirect legal effect, what might 
be termed a “soft” legal effect.3  As with many laws, both international and 
domestic, the substantive commitments contained in the Convention are vague 
and imprecise.  Legal scholars often make a distinction between “rules” and 
“standards” in terms of how precise a law is.4  As an ideal type, a “rule” is a law 
that that can be applied without any interpretation.  An example is the speed limit.  
If the speed limit is 65 miles per hour, one only needs to answer the factual 
question of how fast the driver was going to know whether he was speeding.  By 
contrast, if the rule is that drivers must drive at a “reasonable” speed, one must 
both interpret what “reasonableness” means and then determine factually 
whether the driver’s conduct conforms to the law.  The commitments made by 
parties to the Convention are more like standards than rules.  By this I mean that 
no one – other parties, the Committee, outside observers, etc. – can determine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  United	  States	  of	  America	  reserves	  the	  right	  to	  assume	  obligations	  under	   the	   Convention	   in	   a	   manner	   consistent	   with	   its	   fundamental	  principles	   of	   federalism,	   pursuant	   to	   which	   both	   federal	   and	   state	  criminal	  laws	  must	  be	  considered	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  conduct	  addressed	  in	  the	  Convention.	  	  U.S.	  federal	  criminal	  law,	  which	  regulates	  conduct	  based	   on	   its	   effect	   on	   interstate	   or	   foreign	   commerce,	   or	   another	  federal	  interest,	  serves	  as	  the	  principal	  legal	  regime	  within	  the	  United	  States	  for	  combating	  organized	  crime,	  and	  is	  broadly	  effective	  for	  this	  purpose.	   	  Federal	  criminal	  law	  does	  not	  apply	  in	  the	  rare	  case	  where	  such	   criminal	   conduct	   does	   not	   so	   involve	   interstate	   or	   foreign	  commerce,	  or	  another	   federal	   interest.	   	  There	  are	  a	   small	  number	  of	  conceivable	   situations	   involving	   such	   rare	   offenses	   of	   a	   purely	   local	  character	   where	   U.S.	   federal	   and	   state	   criminal	   law	   may	   not	   be	  entirely	  adequate	  to	  satisfy	  an	  obligation	  under	  the	  Convention.	   	  The	  United	   States	   of	   America	   therefore	   reserves	   to	   the	   obligations	   set	  forth	   in	   the	   Convention	   to	   the	   extent	   they	   address	   conduct	   which	  would	   fall	   within	   this	   narrow	   category	   of	   highly	   localized	  activity.	   	  This	  reservation	  does	  not	  affect	   in	  any	  respect	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  provide	  international	  cooperation	  to	  other	  Parties	  as	  contemplated	  in	  the	  Convention.	  3	  See,	  e.g.,	  Andrew	  T.	  Guzman	  &	  Timothy	  L.	  Meyer,	  International	  Soft	  Law,	  2	  J.	  Legal	  Analysis	   171	   (2010);	   Mark	   A.	   Pollack	   &	   Gregory	   C.	   Shaffer,	   Hard	   v.	   Soft	   Law:	  	  
Alternatives,	  Complements,	  and	  Antagonists	  in	  International	  Governance,	  94	  Minn.	  L.	  Rev.	   706	   (2010);	   Andrew	   T.	   Guzman	   &	   Timothy	   L.	   Meyer,	   International	   Common	  
Law:	  	  The	  Soft	  Law	  of	  International	  Tribunals,	  9	  Chi.	  J.	  Int’l	  L.	  515	  (2009);	  Kenneth	  W.	  Abbott	  &	  Duncan	  Snidal,	  Hard	  and	  Soft	  Law	  in	  International	  Governance,	  54	  Int’l	  Org.	  (	  2000).	  4	  See,	  e.g.,	  Louis	  Kaplow,	  Rules	  Versus	  Standards:	  	  An	  Economic	  Analysis,	  42	  Duke	  L.J.	  557	  (1992).	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whether a state is complying with its obligations under the Convention without 
first forming some more specific notion of what the commitments undertaken in 
the Convention require.   
 
The implementation of the Convention thus necessarily requires some 
interpretation of the Convention’s terms.  As the United States has consistently 
maintained, the authority to issue legally binding interpretations of a treaty 
remains with the parties to the treaty unless the treaty specifically says 
otherwise.5  But in considering the reports made by parties to the Convention, the 
Committee unavoidably has to give some meaning to the Convention’s vague 
obligations.  It cannot otherwise assess the relationship between specific 
practices described in parties’ reports and the vague language of the Convention.  
Moreover, states parties to the Convention may look to the Committee for 
guidance as to how they might interpret the obligations created by the 
Convention. Thus, even though the Committee’s suggestions, recommendations, 
and comments are not legally binding, they can in some circumstances influence 
how other actors – parties to the Convention, including domestic courts and 
administrative agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations – interpret 
and apply the Convention.  In effect, an expert committee’s recommendations 
can sometimes become a focal point around which the expectations of a treaty’s 
parties coalesce when determining what constitutes compliance with vague 
treaty terms.6  
 
This phenomenon is perhaps easiest to observe among international tribunals.  
Like the Committee on Disabilities’ suggestions, recommendations and 
comments, the decisions of most international tribunals are non-binding with 
respect to states not party to the dispute.7  There is thus little formal role for 
precedent in international law.  In general neither international courts nor expert 
committees can lay down interpretations of treaties that bind the parties to the 
treaty prospectively. Nevertheless, tribunals frequently cite to and follow their 
own precedents, as well as the precedents of other tribunals.8  The World Trade 
Organization’s Appellate Body has justified this practice as follows: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  See,	   e.g.,	   Human	   Rights	   Committee,	   Summary	   of	   the	   2380th	   Meeting,	   U.N.	   Doc.	  CCPR/C/SR.2380	  	  ¶	  8	  (July	  27,	  2006)	  (in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  delegation	  noted	  in	  a	  colloquy	  with	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  that	  “in	  general,	  only	  the	  parties	  to	  a	  treaty	  were	  empowered	  to	  give	  a	  binding	  interpretation	  of	  its	  provisions	  unless	  the	  treaty	  provided	  otherwise.”).	  	  	  6	  See	  Andrew	  T.	  Guzman	  &	  Timothy	  L.	  Meyer,	  International	  Soft	  Law,	  2	  J.	  Legal	  Analysis	  171,	  203	  (2010).	  	  	  7	  See,	  e.g.,	   Statute	  of	   the	   International	  Court	  of	   Justice	  art.	  59	  (“The	  decision	  of	   the	  Court	   has	   no	   binding	   force	   except	   between	   the	   parties	   and	   in	   respect	   of	   that	  particular	  case.”)	  8	  See	  Harlan	  Grant	  Cohen,	  The	  Strategy	  of	  International	  Precedent,	  in	  INTERPRETATION	  IN	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  (Andrea	  Bianchi,	  et	  al	  eds	  forthcoming	  2014).	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[It is well settled that Appellate Body reports are not binding, except 
with respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties.  
This, however, does not mean that subsequent panels are free to 
disregard the legal interpretations and the ration decidendi 
contained in previous Appellate Body reports that have been 
adopted by the DSB . . . Dispute settlement practice demonstrates 
that WTO Members attach significance to reasoning provided in 
previous panel and Appellate Body reports [emphasis added].9 
 
The mechanism through which international tribunals and expert committees 
have legal effect is thus not through any binding force of the decisions 
themselves, but rather because – and only to the extent that – parties to the 
Convention follow the interpretations and reasoning adopted by tribunals. 
Similarly, the Committee’s interpretations of the Convention could be given effect 
when other legal actors attach significance to the reasoning or opinions provided 
by the Committee.  This indirect effect is observable in the practice of U.S. 
government agencies. To give but one illustrative example, a 2005 memo from 
the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel considered a report of the 
Committee Against Torture (a committee created by the Convention Against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment (CAT) with a 
mandate similar to the Committee on Disabilities) alongside opinions of the Ninth 
Circuit of Appeals and the European Court of Human Rights in interpreting 
federal legislation implementing the CAT by prohibiting torture.10   
 
An analogy to domestic lawmaking may help clarify the nature of the soft legal 
effect that these committees have.  Domestic legal institutions frequently act in 
ways that do not have binding legal effect on other institutions, but nevertheless 
have indirect legal effects.  I will highlight two particular kinds of domestic acts 
that are regularly given indirect legal effect but are not themselves law.  First, 
congressional resolutions are not binding law. Yet scholars have argued that, 
despite the non-binding nature of resolutions, they are given soft legal effect 
when courts, administrative agencies, or the President incorporate congressional 
views expressed in resolutions into binding policies or rulings.11  Similarly, the 
legislative history of statutes is not itself binding law. Nevertheless, courts 
routinely give legislative history legal effect when they use it to interpret 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Stainless	  Steel	  (Mexico-­‐United	  States)	  p.	  158-­‐160,	  WT/DS344/AB/R,	  30	  April	  2008.	  10	  Memo	   for	   John	   A.	   Rizzo,	   Senior	   Deputy	   General	   Counsel,	   Central	   Intelligence	  Agency,	   from	   Steven	   G.	   Bradbury,	   Principal	   Deputy	   Assistant	   Attorney	   General,	  Office	   of	   Legal	   Counsel,	   Department	   of	   Justice	   (May	   10,	   2005),	   available	   at:	  	  http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torture_archive/docs/Bradbury%20memo.pdf.	  	  11	  Jacob	  E.	  Gersen	  &	  Eric	  A.	  Posner,	  Soft	  Law:	  Lessons	  From	  Congressional	  Practice,	  61	  Stan.	  L.	  Rev.	  573	  (2008).	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statutes.12  Second, domestic courts routinely cite the decisions of other courts 
as persuasive authority even when they are not bound to follow those courts’ 
rulings.  Federal circuit courts, for example, regularly look to each other’s 
reasoning and analysis in interpreting federal law.  They are free to, and 
frequently do, disagree with each other.  But later courts also frequently adopt 
the reasoning and follow the decisions of earlier courts, even in the absence of a 
legal rule compelling that result.  In the same way, non-binding actions by 
international institutions such as the Committee on Disabilities can be given 
indirect legal effect.   
 
Just as the Committee’s non-binding interpretations of the Convention may in 
some circumstances influence how parties view their obligations under the 
Convention, so too can parties’ reactions to the Committee’s interpretation shape 
the development of customary international law.  It bears repeating that this does 
not mean that the Committee has the authority to make customary international 
law.  It does not.  But customary international law “results from a general and 
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”13 
States’ interactions with human rights committees have at least the theoretical 
possibility of creating customary international law should states begin to act in 
accordance with a committee’s interpretations of international law. Notably, 
customary international law does not require that all states participate in the 
practice in order for an obligation to arise.14  Thus, a country not party to a treaty 
or interacting with the committee could nevertheless end up bound by the 
resulting customary obligation. A government can protect itself from being so 
bound – under a doctrine known as the “persistent objector” doctrine – by 
monitoring the practices of other governments and objecting to being bound by a 
customary rule during the time the rule is forming.15 
 
Thus, to simply state that the Committee has no authority to make binding 
determinations or to create customary international law does not do justice to the 
role of the Committee.  The Committee unequivocally does not have the authority 
on its own to create legal obligations for states or to compel any action by parties 
to the Convention.  The Committee cannot direct the United States to take any 
particular action and cannot rewrite American laws.  But the Committee will play 
a role in influencing how the vague obligations in the Convention are interpreted 
and understood by States Parties and other actors.  International law is, in a 
sense, a sort of common law.  It develops through an accretion of precedents 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Andrew	  T.	  Guzman	  &	  Timothy	  Meyer,	  International	  Soft	  Law,	  2	  J.	  Leg.	  Analysis	  171	  (2010).	  	  	  13	  Restatement	  (Third)	  of	  Foreign	  Relations	  Law	  §102(2)	  (1987).	  14	  Restatement	   (Third)	   of	   Foreign	   Relations	   Law	   §102,	   comment	   b	   (1987)	   (“A	  practice	  can	  be	  general	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  universally	  followed”).	  15	  Restatement	   (Third)	   of	   Foreign	   Relations	   Law	   §102,	   comment	   d	   (1987)	   (“[I]n	  principle	  a	  state	  that	  indicates	  its	  dissent	  from	  a	  practice	  while	  the	  law	  is	  still	  in	  the	  process	  of	  development	  is	  not	  bound	  by	  that	  rule	  even	  after	  it	  matures.”).	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and through negotiations, both implicit and explicit, about the legal significance 
that should be accorded to the non-binding acts of institutions like the 
Committee.  The question is thus how to best promote U.S. interests in light of 
the Convention and the role it affords the Committee.   
 
 
POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDINGS TO THE CRPD 
 
Significantly, not ratifying the CRPD would not necessarily eliminate the 
Committee’s role in influencing how other states perceive the United States’ 
human rights obligations for two reasons.  First, as discussed above, the 
Committee’s interpretations and its dialogues with states are precedential acts 
that can contribute to the creation of customary international law. In its 
examinations of parties’ reports, expert committees sometimes opine that 
particular treaty obligations constitute customary international law.16  There is no 
denying that expert committees at times issue recommendations that go beyond 
what the parties contemplated when entering into a treaty.17   Because the 
formation of a rule of customary international law does not require affirmative 
consent from all nations, failing to object to these expansive claims can lead to 
claims that a country is bound by rules it played no role in forming.  The U.S. 
government officials charged with appearing before human rights bodies and 
monitoring the activities of those bodies have ever been vigilant in protecting 
American interests against overreaching interpretations of what international law 
requires.18  Having the opportunity to nominate an American to serve on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16 	  See,	   e.g.,	   Human	   Rights	   Committee,	   General	   Comment	   24(52)	   ¶	   8,	   General	  comment	  on	   issues	  relating	  to	  reservations	  made	  upon	  ratification	  or	  accession	  to	  the	  Covenant	  or	  the	  Optional	  Protocols	  thereto,	  or	  in	  relation	  to	  declarations	  under	  article	  41	  of	  the	  Covenant,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6	  (1994)	  (asserting	  that	  “a	  State	  may	  not	  reserve	  the	  right	  to	  engage	  in	  slavery,	  to	  torture,	  to	  subject	  persons	  to	   cruel,	   inhuman	   or	   degrading	   treatment	   or	   punishment,	   to	   arbitrarily	   deprive	  persons	  of	   their	   lives,	   to	  arbitrarily	  arrest	  and	  detain	  persons,	   to	  deny	   freedom	  of	  thought,	   conscience	   and	   religion,	   to	  presume	  a	  person	  guilty	  unless	  he	  proves	  his	  innocence,	   to	   execute	   pregnant	   women	   or	   children,	   to	   permit	   the	   advocacy	   of	  national,	  racial	  or	  religious	  hatred,	  to	  deny	  to	  persons	  of	  marriageable	  age	  the	  right	  to	  marry,	  or	  to	  deny	  to	  minorities	  the	  right	  to	  enjoy	  their	  own	  culture,	  profess	  their	  own	  religion,	  or	  use	  their	  own	  language”	  because	  provisions	  in	  the	  ICCPR	  protecting	  such	  rights	  “represent	  customary	  international	  law.”).	  17	  See,	   e.g.,	   Report	   of	   the	   Committee	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   Discrimination	   Against	  Women,	   U.N.	   Doc.	   A/55/38	   	   ¶	   361	   (2000)	   (expressing	   concern	   about	   “the	  reintroduction	  of	  such	  symbols	  as	  Mothers’	  Day	  .	  .	  .”).	  	  	  18	  See,	  e.g.,	   Response	   of	   the	  United	   States	   to	  Recommendations	   of	   the	  U.N.	  Human	  Rights	   Council,	   November	   9,	   2010,	   available	   at:	  	  http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/150677.htm.	   	   In	   his	   remarks,	   State	  Department	  Legal	  Adviser	  Harold	  Hongju	  Koh	  described	  some	  of	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Council’s	   recommendations	   as	   “plainly	   intended	   as	   political	   provocations	   [that]	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Committee and to appear before the Committee is an effective way to ensure 
that the Committee does not become a vehicle for creating customary 
international legal obligations that are contrary to U.S. interests.   
 
Second, expert committees frequently cite to each other and to other human 
rights treaties in interpreting obligations in human rights agreements that 
overlap.19  The CRPD itself expressly authorizes this conduct when it provides 
that: 
 
“The Committee shall, as it discharges its mandate, shall consult, 
as appropriate, other relevant bodies instituted by international 
human rights treaties, with a view to ensuring the consistency of 
their respective reporting guidelines, suggestions and general 
recommendations, and avoiding duplication and overlap in the 
performance of their functions.”  CRPD art. 38(2).   
 
Not ratifying the Convention thus does not ensure that the United States would 
not face arguments that its conduct is inconsistent with human rights obligations 
as interpreted by the Committee on Disabilities.  The CRPD includes a number of 
obligations that overlap with rights contained in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), to which the United States is party.  
Conceivably, the United States could find arguments developed by the 
Committee on Disabilities in its interactions with parties to the CRPD also 
advanced under the ICCPR.  Of course, interpretations developed by the 
Committee on Disabilities and advanced as consistent with obligations under the 
ICCPR would not be binding on the United States, just as interpretations 
developed by the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR and the Committee 
on Disabilities under the CRPD are non-binding.  But by not participating in the 
development of these interpretations before the CRPD, the United States may 
lose some influence over how other nations’ understand the United States’ 
commitments under those treaties it has ratified.   
 
In light of these considerations, I have two recommendations on how the United 
States might protect and advance its interests while ratifying the CRPD.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  cannot	  be	  taken	  seriously.”	  	  See	  also	  Observations	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  on	  General	  Comment	  24,	   in	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  AS	  GENERAL	  NORMS	  AND	  A	  STATE’S	  RIGHT	  TO	  OPT	  OUT:	   	   RESERVATIONS	   AND	  OBJECTIONS	   TO	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  CONVENTIONS	   	   (J.P.	   Gardner,	   ed.	  1997)	  (noting	  that	  paragraph	  8	  of	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Committee’s	  General	  Comment	  24	   “asserts	   in	   a	   wholly	   conclusory	   fashion	   that	   a	   number	   of	   propositions	   are	  customary	  international	  law	  which,	  to	  speak	  plainly,	  are	  not.”).	  	  	  19	  See,	   e.g.,	   Draft	   General	   Comment	   on	   Article	   9	   of	   the	   CRPD	   ¶	   5	   (citing	   General	  Comments	   of	   the	   Committees	   on	   Economic,	   Social,	   and	   Cultural	   Rights	   and	   the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child).	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First, American interests at home can be protected through a declaration that the 
CRPD is not self-executing, as well as a package of reservations, 
understandings, and declarations (RUDs) that clarify that the United States is not 
undertaking any commitments that exceed the extensive rights available under 
existing federal and state laws.  These RUDs signal to the Committee and other 
States Parties to the Convention the limits on the commitments the United States 
is making by ratifying the Convention.  They also ensure that the power to 
change federal law remains with Congress.  These RUDs are important.  As the 
Administration has made clear, the United States tends to follow a practice of 
“compliance before ratification.”20 RUDs thus give the United States the ability to 
ratify the Convention knowing we are already in compliance with the 
commitments that we are making, while increasing our ability to influence how 
the Convention’s obligations are interpreted by parties that ratify before 
complying.  
 
Second, the ability of expert committees to influence the views of parties as to 
how to interpret their binding legal obligations (or about the existence of a rule of 
customary international law) has led expert committees to claim that they have 
the ability to make “authoritative” interpretations of the treaties they are charged 
with implementing, even while conceding that their interpretations are not legally 
binding.21  To the extent that this claim refers to the fact that the parties to a 
treaty may attach significance to the views of a committee, it does little more than 
make a factual claim about how a committee is viewed by the governments that 
created it.   
 
Committees might also be understood, however, to be making a claim that their 
rulings have a formal legal status somewhere between “binding” and “non-
binding.”  That is, expert committees might be understood to be arguing that their 
interpretations of a treaty are entitled to greater weight when considered by a 
treaty’s parties than are the views of, say, a law professor.22   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Opening	   Remarks	   of	   Legal	   Adviser	   Harold	   Hongju	   Koh	   to	   the	   United	   Nations	  Committee	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	   Child	   Concerning	   the	   Optional	   Protocols	   to	   the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child	  (January	  16,	  2013).	  	  	  21	  See,	   e.g.,	   Human	   Rights	   Committee,	   Summary	   of	   the	   2380th	   Meeting,	   U.N.	   Doc.	  CCPR/C/SR.2380	   	   ¶	   57	   (July	   27,	   2006)	   (in	   which	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Committee	  asserts	  in	  a	  colloquy	  with	  the	  United	  States’	  delegation	  that	  “its	  findings,	  while	  not	  legally	  binding,	  had	  considerable	  authoritative	  status.”).	  	  	  22	  See	   Observations	   of	   the	   United	   States	   of	   America	   on	   General	   Comment	   24,	   in	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	   AS	   GENERAL	  NORMS	   AND	   A	   STATE’S	   RIGHT	   TO	  OPT	  OUT:	   	   RESERVATIONS	   AND	  OBJECTIONS	   TO	   HUMAN	   RIGHTS	   CONVENTIONS	   	   (J.P.	   Gardner,	   ed.	   1997).	   	   In	   its	  observations,	   the	   United	   States	   responded	   to	   General	   Comment	   24	   of	   the	  Human	  Rights	   Committee	   (“HRC”),	   which	   arguably	   asserted	   that	   it	   was	   contrary	   to	   the	  object	   and	   purpose	   of	   the	   Covenant	   on	   Civil	   and	   Political	   Rights	   to	   reject	   the	  interpretations	  of	  the	  HRC.	  	  The	  United	  States	  clarified	  that	  “it	  is	  unnecessary	  for	  a	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The United States could use ratification of the CRPD to clarify once again that 
the parties to the Convention are under no obligation to accord any weight to 
expert committee’s interpretations. Last year when this Committee reported the 
CRPD to the full Senate, it included a proposed understanding stating: 
 
The United States of America understands that the Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, established under Article 34 of 
the Convention, is authorized under Article 36 to ‘‘consider’’ State 
Party Reports and to ‘‘make such suggestions and general 
recommendations on the report as it may consider appropriate.’’ 
Under Article 37, the Committee ‘‘shall give due consideration to 
ways and means of enhancing national capacities for the 
implementation of the present Convention.’’ The United States of 
America understands that the Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities has no authority to compel actions by states parties, 
and the United States of America does not consider conclusions, 
recommendations, or general comments issued by the Committee as 
constituting customary international law or to be legally binding on 
the United States in any manner.23 
 
This understanding could be supplemented in two ways to make clear that the 
United States does not recognize the authority of the Committee to interpret the 
Convention. First, the understanding could include a sentence stating that:  
 
“The United States further understands that the Committee’s 
interpretations of the Convention are not entitled to any weight 
apart from that given to them by States Parties to the Convention.”   
 
Such an understanding goes beyond the 2012 understanding by clarifying that 
the Committee’s interpretations are not due any deference by parties to the 
Convention.  Such an understanding is consistent with the text of the Convention, 
which imposes no obligations on parties to adopt or agree with the Committee’s 
views on what the Convention requires.  
 
Second, the understanding could include a sentence making clear that the United 
States preserves its right to consent to any interpretations of the Convention, 
from whatever source, before they have any effect whatsoever in the United 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  state	  to	  reserve	  as	  to	  the	  Committee’s	  power	  or	  interpretative	  competence	  since	  the	  Committee	  lacks	  the	  authority	  to	  render	  binding	  interpretations	  or	  judgments.”	  	  Id.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Report	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Relations	  on	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Persons	  with	  Disabilities	  §	  7	  (July	  31,	  2012).	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States.  For example, a sentence might be added to the understanding stating 
that:  
 
“Moreover, the United States understands that no interpretation of 
the obligations of the Convention issued by the Committee or any 
other international institution can have binding legal effect with 
regard to the United States unless the United States consents to 
such an interpretation in accordance with its constitutionally-
required procedures.”   
 
This understanding makes clear that by joining the Convention the United States 
has not delegated any authority to any international institution to create legal 
obligations for the United States.  It therefore preserves the primacy of the United 
States’ domestic lawmaking process in determining what international obligations 
bind the United States. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present these views on 
the CRPD.  International institutions such as the Committee on Disabilities have 
proliferated in recent decades and an accurate understanding of what they do 
and do not do is critical to engaging with these institutions in a way that protects 
and advances the interests of the United States.  A simple binary conception of 
the legal effect – either binding or non-binding – of the Committee’s suggestions, 
reports, and recommendations, does not do justice to the ways in which the 
Committee can have indirect, “soft” legal effects. A more nuanced understanding 
of how these institutions works offers the possibility of a more effective strategy 
for ensuring that U.S. involvement with these institutions promotes U.S. interests. 
 	  	  
